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We introduce credit frictions motivated by moral hazard in a general equilibrium model of
international trade with two dimensions of heterogeneity and endogenous investments. Firms'
competitiveness consists of capabilities to conduct process and quality innovations at low costs,
whereas investment outlays have to be nanced by external capital. We show that the scope for
vertical product dierentiation in a sector determines how credit tightening aects investment
and price setting. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, our model rationalizes positive
as well as negative correlations of rm-level FOB prices with nancial frictions and variable
trade costs. Faced with an increase in the borrowing rate, producers reduce both types of
innovation resulting in opposing eects on marginal production costs and prices. In general
equilibrium, nancial frictions intensify quality-based (cost-based) sorting of rms if the scope
for vertical product dierentiation is high (low). Consequently, credit tightening leads to rm
exit, increased innovation activity among existing suppliers, and welfare losses that are larger
in sectors with low investment intensity.
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1 Introduction
A growing empirical literature documents negative eects of credit constraints on rms'
export behavior. Exporting usually requires additional upfront costs for investments in
marketing, capacity, product customization or distribution networks. Transportation leads to
longer time lags between investment outlays and prot realization.1 Consequently, empirical
studies nd that credit rationing decreases rm-level exports and reduces the probability
of serving foreign markets (Berman and Hericourt, 2010; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Muûls,
2014). Recent theoretical work based on xed upfront costs and rm heterogeneity a la
Melitz (2003) shows that nancial frictions prevent foreign market entry of low productivity
rms (e.g. Manova, 2013). Besides intensied productivity sorting, credit constraints and
leverage negatively aect exporters' choice of product quality (Fan, Lai, and Li, 2015; Bernini,
Guillou, and Bellone, 2013; Ciani and Bartoli, 2014). Firm-level studies document a positive
relation of prices with rm size which points to competition through quality (Baldwin and
Harrigan, 2011; Johnson, 2012; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Crozet, Head, and Mayer,
2012). In contrast, cost-based productivity sorting a la Melitz (2003) suggests a negative
correlation between prices and rm size (Roberts and Supina, 1996; Foster, Haltiwanger, and
Syverson, 2008).
Depending on the importance of quality dierentiation, recent empirical studies nd
opposing eects of credit frictions on price setting. For Italian rm-level data, Secchi, Ta-
magni, and Tomasi (2014) show that nancially constrained exporters charge higher prices
than unconstrained rms within the same product-destination market, whereas this positive
relationship is reduced for product categories with high vertical dierentiation. The authors
follow Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and measure the scope for vertical product dierentia-
tion as the ratio of advertising and R&D expenditures to total sales in U.S. industries. Using
Chinese rm-level data, Fan et al. (2015) nd negative eects of nancial frictions on FOB
prices. Furthermore, Fan, Li, and Yeaple (2014) show that tari reductions induce quality
upgrading associated with higher prices in highly dierentiated sectors and lower prices in
non-dierentiated sectors.
Motivated by this empirical evidence, we analyze the eects of credit frictions on endoge-
nous innovation choices, price setting and selection into exporting when both cost-based
productivity and product quality determine the competitiveness of a producer. The main
message of this paper is that credit tightening increases price (quality) competition if the
sectoral scope for vertical product dierentiation is low (high). Therefore, we develop a
1See Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Chor and Manova (2012), as well as Feenstra, Li, and Yu (2014).
Contessi and de Nicola (2012) as well as Manova and Foley (2014) provide reviews of the trade and nance
literature.
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general equilibrium model of international trade with credit constraints, two sources of rm
heterogeneity and endogenous sunk costs. We allow for both cost-based and quality-based
sorting as producers dier in capabilities to conduct process and quality innovations. Invest-
ments are associated with endogenous sunk costs that decrease in rm-specic capabilities.
In contrast to standard models with monopolistic competition, innovation choices endoge-
nously determine marginal production costs. Depending on their capabilities, rms choose
dierent investment levels and prices. Process innovations decrease marginal costs and hence
increase the cost-based productivity of a rm for any given quality level. Whereas this chan-
nel is closely related to productivity sorting in Melitz (2003), the second type of investment
is motivated by the quality and trade literature. Quality innovations shift demand up at the
expense of higher marginal production costs. The two types of innovation are complements
as they increase price-adjusted quality and thus prots. Firms have to raise external capital
for investment outlays, whereas labor is used for xed and variable production costs. Based
on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we motivate credit constraints by moral hazard between
borrowing rms and outside investors. In equilibrium, only the most capable rms over-
come nancial frictions and become exporters, whereas some low capability producers with
protable investment projects fail to borrow external capital and exit the market.
We use this framework to show that the scope for vertical product dierentiation in a
sector determines how dierent nancial shocks aect optimal rm behavior and export per-
formance. Consistent with the empirical evidence mentioned above, our model rationalizes
positive as well as negative relations of rm-level FOB prices with trade and credit costs. An
increase in the borrowing rate negatively aects both types of innovation and triggers quality
as well as cost eects that inuence marginal production costs and thus optimal prices in
opposite directions. Lower process innovations increase marginal costs (cost eect), whereas
reduced product quality decreases prices (quality eect). If the scope for vertical product
dierentiation is high (low), the quality (cost) eect dominates and tighter credit conditions
are associated with lower (higher) rm-level prices. This measure for quality dierentiation
is dened as the ratio of expenditures associated with product upgrades relative to invest-
ment outlays for processes. Theoretically, this ratio is independent of rm capabilities and
only determined by exogenous technology parameters. Empirically, the measure is closely
related to sectoral proxies of vertical dierentiation used in rm-level studies.2 Analogously,
changes in variable trade costs induce opposing quality and cost eects as well.
We analyze the eects of credit frictions on investment and price setting both in partial
and general equilibrium. Whereas the partial equilibrium results could be interpreted as
short-term eects of credit tightening with a xed number of suppliers, the general equi-
2See Sutton (2001) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) as well as the discussion in section 4.
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librium scenario allows for adjustments along the extensive margin. In general equilibrium,
stronger credit frictions reduce the number of active producers and intensify quality-based
(cost-based) sorting of rms if the scope for vertical product dierentiation is high (low). In
contrast to partial equilibrium, innovation activity as well as rm size of existing suppliers
increases. Intuitively, the negative eect of credit frictions along the extensive margin en-
hances the benets of investments for active rms resulting in an equilibrium with a lower
number of producers that are larger on average. Furthermore, we show that credit tighten-
ing leads to welfare losses that dier across sectors with high and low investment intensity
(either quality or cost-based). In sectors with low investment intensity, credit frictions in-
duce stronger reactions along the extensive margin and thus lead to larger welfare losses. In
contrast, an increase in the borrowing rate that is not caused by nancial imperfections, but
rather a decrease in capital supply, leads to negative reactions along the intensive margin.
This cost shock causes stronger within-rm adjustments and thus larger welfare losses in
sectors with high investment intensity.
Our paper diers from the theoretical trade and nance literature in several important
aspects. First, we analyze the impact of credit frictions in a framework with both cost-
based and quality-based sorting. The scope for vertical product dierentiation in a sector
determines the selection pattern of rms and how nancial shocks aect optimal investment
and pricing behavior. Second, we consider external nancing of investment outlays instead of
trade related upfront costs. Third, we allow for credit constraints not only among exporters,
but also among non-exporters. Fourth, we do not restrict our analysis to partial equilibrium,
but rather show that general equilibrium eects change rm responses to credit tightening.
Finally, we investigate the welfare implications of nancial shocks. The next section reviews
related theoretical literature. Section 3 sets up the model and derives optimal rm behavior.
In part 4, we analyze the eects of nancial shocks and of trade liberalization on investment
and price setting in partial equilibrium. The following two sections discuss credit frictions
in general equilibrium. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Related theoretical literature
Most closely related to our theoretical setup with two dimensions of heterogeneity, Hallak
and Sivadasan (2013) and Sutton (2007) develop two-attribute rm models of international
trade with endogenous sunk costs. Besides Melitz-type productivity, Hallak and Sivadasan
(2013) allow producers to dier in their ability to develop high-quality products at low xed
outlays. We additionally consider endogenous process investments and introduce credit fric-
tions. Whereas our framework is based on monopolistic competition, Sutton (2007) considers
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Cournot competition and non-CES preferences and thus allows only for vertical product dif-
ferentiation but neglects horizontal dierentiation. Similar to these papers, cost-based and
quality-based capabilities jointly determine rms' competitiveness in our model and are sum-
marized in a one-dimensional productivity measure related to Melitz (2003). Whereas we
focus on single product manufacturers, Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2011) introduce het-
erogeneity in product attributes within the boundaries of multi-product rms that dier in
productivity as in Melitz (2003). In a multi-product rm model with exible manufactur-
ing and quality investment, Eckel, Iacovone, Javorcik, and Neary (2015) show that prices
fall with distance from the core product (quality-based competence) in dierentiated-good
sectors, but the opposite holds in non-dierentiated sectors (cost-based competence).
Closely related to our analysis, Fan et al. (2014) extend a Melitz-type partial equilibrium
model by endogenous quality choice to rationalize positive as well as negative relations of
rm-level FOB prices with trade costs depending on the sectoral scope for vertical product
dierentiation. Fan et al. (2015) build on Arkolakis (2010) as well as Manova (2013) and
dierentiate between exogenous and endogenous quality. The authors show that nancially
constrained rms sell at higher prices when quality is exogenous, whereas the opposite holds
in case of endogenous quality choice. In contrast, our model explains the prevalence of
quality and cost eects when rms endogenously choose two innovation types that aect
marginal production costs and thus prices in opposite ways. Furthermore, we analyze the
eects of nancial shocks in general equilibrium.
Additionally, this paper is related to work that considers investment decisions of hetero-
geneous rms. Bustos (2011), Lileeva and Treer (2010) as well as Yeaple (2005) allow for
process innovations that reduce marginal production costs. Consistent with our framework,
these models predict that trade liberalization increases the incentives of technology upgrad-
ing. With respect to quality, we build on recent eorts to extend international trade models
by quality sorting (Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Johnson, 2012) as well as endogenous quality
and input choices (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Antoniades, 2015).
Furthermore, this paper is related to a growing literature on nancial frictions and in-
ternational trade with heterogeneous rms. These models are mainly based on productivity
sorting a la Melitz (2003) and focus on nancial constraints of exporters. In contrast, we
assume that domestic as well as international sellers face credit frictions concerning endoge-
nous innovation choices. Manova (2013) considers external nancing of xed and variable
export costs and motivates credit constraints by imperfect nancial contractibility. By in-
troducing liquidity as a second source of heterogeneity, Chaney (2013) and Suwantaradon
(2012) break up the one-to-one relationship between productivity and rm success in the
presence of credit constraints. While we assume that endogenous innovations have to be
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nanced by external capital, these approaches stress the role of internal funds for nancing
of xed export costs (Chaney, 2013) and capital inputs (Suwantaradon, 2012). Feenstra
et al. (2014) introduce nancial frictions by information asymmetry between rms and a
monopolistic bank. Instead, we assume perfect competition in the nancial sector and sym-
metric information with respect to rm characteristics, but ex-post moral hazard motivated
by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) introduces nancial frictions.
Closely related to our notion of credit constraints, four other papers introduce imperfect
capital markets motivated by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in international trade settings.
First, von Ehrlich and Seidel (2013) analyze the impact of nancial frictions on agglomera-
tion of industries in a new economic geography model based on Krugman (1991). Second,
Egger and Keuschnigg (2015) show how discrete R&D investment choices generate endoge-
nous nancial constraints. Third, Irlacher and Unger (2015) introduce rm-specic credit
frictions and endogenous borrowing costs in a model of international trade. Fourth, in the
framework of Antras and Caballero (2009), rms engage in FDI as a response to imperfect
nancial contracting and weak investor protection in the host country. Related to that,
Buch, Kesternich, Lipponer, and Schnitzer (2010) analyze the impact of nancial frictions
on FDI based on Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). Other work considers credit frictions
in the model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) with varying markups (Peters and Schnitzer,
2015; Mayneris, 2011).
3 Setup of the model
To analyze the impact of credit conditions on innovation and optimal price setting, this
section presents a general equilibrium model of international trade with two sources of rm
heterogeneity. We consider two symmetric countries with population of size L and capital
endowment K, trading in dierentiated varieties. Producers dier in their capabilities to
introduce process and quality innovations at low costs. Motivated by a time lag between
innovation activity and prot realization, we assume that investment outlays have to be
nanced by external capital, whereas labor is used for xed and variable production costs.
Capital costs are denoted by the gross interest rate r > 1, and the nominal wage is chosen as
numeraire (w = 1). Following Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we introduce a non-veriable
project choice of rms which leads to moral hazard and credit frictions. The following
subsections discuss the optimal behavior of consumers and producers.
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3.1 Consumers
Preferences of a representative consumer in one country are characterized by a CES utility












where  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution and qi denotes the quality of a product. The













From the consumer's maximization problem follows that demand for one dierentiated vari-








By introducing a quality component in the utility function of the representative consumer
(1), we follow the quality and trade literature.3 Product quality qi is endogenously chosen
by producers and shifts demand outwards for any given price. Additionally, rms decide on
the level of process innovations. The next two subsections describe optimal rm behavior in
the presence of credit frictions.
3.2 Production and investment with credit constraints
The production sector of the economy is characterized by monopolistic competition. Each
rm manufactures one dierentiated variety i and decides on process and quality innovations








Parameters  and  determine the convexity of the investment cost functions and are ex-




reect the elasticities of quality
and processes to innovation outlays. Low values of  and  imply that one additional unit
3See e.g. Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), and Hallak and Sivadasan (2013).
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of investment spending is very eective.4 Producers dier in their capabilities to invest in
process innovations 'i and quality upgrades i:
5 Higher values of these rm-specic draws
scale down investment costs and hence increase incentives to innovate. The two types of




with 0 <  < 1: (5)
The benet of process innovations e is a reduction of marginal production costs which is
closely related to the productivity draw in Melitz (2003). Quality innovations q increase
demand for one variety (3), but are associated with higher labor requirements, where  de-
scribes the sensitivity of marginal costs to changes in quality. The positive relation between
product quality and marginal production costs can be motivated by advertising expenditures
or marketing. Related to our approach, other papers endogenize rm's quality choice and
consider additional product-specic outlays or the use of higher-quality inputs.6 As we al-
low for both cost-based and quality-based sorting with endogenous sunk costs, our model is
closely related to Sutton (2007, 2012) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2013). Compared to previ-
ous work, we analyze the impact of credit conditions on two types of investment. Therefore,
we assume that rms have to cover expenditures associated with endogenous innovations (4)
by external capital before revenues are realized, whereas labor is used for variable and xed
production costs. The decision problem of a single rm consists of four stages:
1. Entry stage. A potential producer of a dierentiated variety decides to enter the
market and pays a xed entry cost fe. After entry, the rm draws both investment
capabilities ' and  from a joint probability distribution h('; ) with positive support
over ['; '] [; ] :
2. Financial contracting and investment. Producers choose the optimal levels of
process and quality innovations and sign a contract with an outside investor to cover
the investment costs. Optimal prices are set.
3. Moral hazard. After nancial contracting, the agent in the rm chooses to conduct
the project diligently or to misbehave and reap a non-veriable private benet.
4. Production and prot realization. Production and prots are realized and the
loan is repaid to the lender.
4See Sutton (2012), section 1.10, for a comparable specication of quality outlays. In section 3.3, we
impose a convexity assumption for technology parameters  and :
5For notational simplicity we drop the rm's index i in what follows.
6See Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) or Johnson (2012), among others.
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Stages 2 and 3 introduce endogenous investment choices and nancial frictions. Based
on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we motivate credit constraints by a project choice which is
non-veriable for external investors and thus prone to moral hazard. The optimal contract
between a rm and an outside investor species the loan size dl > 0 at a gross interest rate
r > 1, and the credit repayment kl, whereas the index l 2 d; x denotes non-exporters (d) and
exporters (x) respectively. We solve the model by backward induction. The next subsection
describes optimal rm behavior after entry.
3.3 Optimal rm behavior
After entry, rms choose the optimal levels of process (el) and quality innovations (ql) and
set prices at home and possibly in the foreign market. Exporters sell their product to
consumers in an identical foreign country, but face higher xed costs fx > fd, and iceberg-
type transportation costs such that  > 1 units of a good have to be shipped for 1 unit to
arrive. Whereas domestic and export prices of a rm dier because of transportation costs,
we do not allow for market-specic investments. Hence, if a rm exports, the benets of
process and quality innovations are spread across sales in both destinations. Total sales of




x, whereas demand is given by equation (3)
and the dummy variable 1fxx>0g takes a value of 1 if the rm exports and is zero otherwise.














Variable prots net of loan repayment kl realize with success probability 0 <  < 1. Firms
use labor input for xed and variable production costs, but have to nance innovation outlays
by external capital. This assumption can be motivated by a time lag between investment









kl  rdl; (8)
l  0: (9)
The budget constraint (7) states that the received credit amount has to be suciently high
to cover endogenous investment costs. Participation constraints (8) and (9) ensure that
external investors do not incur losses from lending and rms make at least zero prots. We
assume perfect competition in the nancial sector such that equation (8) holds with equality.
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Based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), we motivate credit frictions by moral hazard.
After nancial contracting and loan provision, the success of the investment depends on
a non-veriable project choice within the rm. On the one hand, the agent can decide to
behave diligently and conduct the project properly which implies that prots realize with high
success probability . On the other hand, if the agent chooses to misbehave, the probability
of success is lower b < , but the borrower can reap a share of xed investments as a non-
veriable private benet bfl > 0: The manager faces incentives to implement the project in a
more pleasant way or pursue own advantages at the expense of investment success. Following
Tirole (2006), the private benet can be interpreted as a disutility of eort.7 Hence, both
investment and entrepreneurial eort are inputs in the production process. There are no
information asymmetries with respect to rm characteristics, but the project choice is non-
contractible for external investors which leads to moral hazard. Shirking can be ruled out if
the following incentive compatibility constraint holds:
l  bl + bfl: (10)
We assume that the success probability b is suciently low such that the net present value
of the marginal rm which just meets incentive compatibility (10) is negative in case of
shirking. Thus, the optimal nancial contract has to satisfy incentive compatibility to rule
out misbehavior and potential losses from lending. As long as the private benet is positive,
equation (10) is more restrictive than the zero-prot requirement (9). Hence, only rms
that generate suciently high prots overcome moral hazard and have access to external
nance. As private benets are related to xed costs, exporters face a trade-o between
additional prots from selling abroad in case of diligent behavior and the prospect of higher
perks in case of shirking. To describe the optimal behavior of rms, we proceed in two steps.
First, conditional on access to nance, rms maximize expected prots (6) by taking into
account constraints (7) and (8). Second, incentive compatibility (10) determines access to
external capital and selection into exporting. Solving rm's maximization problem leads to





































7See Tirole (2006), section 3.2, for a disussion of moral hazard in a simple model of credit rationing.
8See Appendix 8.1 for a detailed derivation of rm's maximization problem.
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, Ax  (1 + 
1 )Ad are
measures of market size for domestic sellers and exporters respectively. Consistent with
theoretical and empirical work on investment activity in international trade, our model
suggests a positive relationship between innovation and market size.9 As exporters spread
investment costs across both markets, they face larger incentives to engage in quality and
process innovations, (Ax > Ad), whereas iceberg transportation costs  and the borrowing
rate r reduce investment activity. We assume that investment costs are suciently convex:
;  > (   1) (2  ) ; such that  > 0. The convexity assumption implies that quality and
process innovations are complements and increase in both capabilities ' and : A higher
capability draw for one type of innovation has a direct positive impact on the corresponding
investment level due to lower endogenous sunk costs, and additionally increases the marginal
benet of the other innovation type. This complementary structure relates to the literature
on simultaneous process and product R&D choices and is driven by the fact that both types
of innovation increase the price-adjusted quality and hence the success of a rm in the
market.10 Consequently, producers will always engage in both types of innovation, whereas





















The convexity assumption regarding endogenous sunk costs implies further that investments
in process innovations relative to quality upgrades increase in the cost-based capability and






< 0: Additionally, the relative invest-
ment increases in  and decreases in  as rms react to changes in the relative eectiveness
of innovations. A higher sensitivity of marginal production costs with respect to quality
(larger ) reduces the marginal benet of vertical product dierentiation and increases the
relative investment in processes. In the extreme case, if  = 1; higher quality leads to a
one-to-one increase in marginal costs (5), such that marginal benets of product upgrades
and thus innovation choices (11) and (12) are driven down to zero.
Analogous to standard models with monopolistic competition and CES demand struc-
ture, rms set the optimal price as a constant markup over marginal costs. In contrast to
Melitz (2003), marginal production costs are endogenously determined by the two innovation
9See Bustos (2011) as well as Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), among others.
10Theoretical studies discuss complementarities between product and process innovations under dierent
modes of market competition (Athey and Schmutzler, 1995; Lin and Saggi, 2002; Rosenkranz, 2003), as well
as over the product life cycle (Klepper, 1996; Lambertini and Mantovani, 2010).
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and px('; ) = px('; ) stands for the export price of internationally active producers. The
pricing rule captures two opposing eects of investment behavior. A higher level of process
innovations enhances production eciency, whereas quality innovations increase marginal
costs according to equation (5). Consequently, the optimal price decreases in the cost-based
capability ', but increases in the quality-based capability .11 Hence, the setup with two
innovation choices captures both a negative relation between prices and rm size based on
cost-based sorting a la Melitz (2003) and a positive correlation between prices and rm size
as suggested by the recent quality and trade literature (e.g. Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012).
The success of a producer in the market results from the ability to invest in processes as well
as product quality at low costs. Therefore, we dene rm's overall eciency as a combination
of both capabilities: z = '(1 ). Figure 1 depicts an example for an iso-eciency curve
in the two-dimensional space, whereas the vertical axis shows the quality-based capability 
and the horizontal axis shows the cost-based capability ': The curve represents a non-linear
trade-o between the two attributes: @
@'
< 0 and @
2
@'2
> 0: If a rm possesses a low ability to
invest in processes (low '); it requires a relatively high quality-based capability  to achieve
the same overall eciency level. Firms located along a particular iso-eciency curve earn
the same expected revenues and prots, since the latter can be expressed as monotone and


















(   1) v

sl(z)  fl; (16)









> 0: Comparable to single-attribute rm models, eciency z is
a one-dimensional measure of prots and rm size. However, producers with the same size
or eciency z choose dierent levels of quality and process innovations and thus set dierent
prices, depending on their rm-specic capabilities. Revenues and prots depend positively
on market size Al, but negatively on the borrowing rate r and investment cost parameters













0, if  >  1

. Note that this condition for the technology parameter  is more restrictive than the convexity
assumption discussed earlier in this section.
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 and . Equations (11)-(16) characterize the optimal behavior of rms that have access to
external nance. The next subsection takes into account incentive compatibility (10) which
determines the selection of rms into exporting.
3.4 Selection of rms
Only rms that meet incentive compatibility (10) receive credit from outside investors. As
prots (16) are a function of eciency z, the binding nancial constraint (10) determines a




















whereas  = 1 + b
 b
reects agency costs from moral hazard. Independent of export
status, this measure captures nancial frictions and determines the dierence between the






If the private benet b is equal to zero, nancial frictions disappear and incentive compati-
bility collapses to a zero-prot condition ( = 1). Whenever the private benet is positive
( > 1), moral hazard prevents external nancing of protable investment projects as some
lower eciency rms satisfy the zero-prot condition (9), but not incentive compatibility
(10). Thus, nancial imperfections impede market access of small producers which is consis-
tent with existing heterogeneous rm models that allow for credit constraints (e.g. Manova,
2013). Note that Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) consider dierences in wealth, whereas in
our model rm-specic innovation capabilities determine access to external capital. Hence,
we neglect the role of internal liquidity to overcome credit frictions as analyzed by Chaney
(2013). If xed fx and variable trade costs  are suciently high, only the most capable
rms select into exporting:




1 +  1 
 
 > 1: (19)
This condition diers from Melitz (2003) because exporters spread expenditures associated
with endogenous investments across sales in both markets.12




Proposition 1 If Condition (19) holds, the most ecient rms with z  zx export. Pro-
ducers in the middle range of the eciency distribution (zd  z < zx) sell only domestically,
while the least ecient rms (z < zd) have no access to external nance and exit.
Graphically, equation (17) species the location of a marginal-access curve in the two-
dimensional capability space ('; ). Figure 2 depicts the selection pattern of rms under
Proposition 1, whereby the marginal-access curve for exporting lies above the one for do-
mestic activity.13 Marginal rms, characterized by cuto eciencies zd and zx, just meet
incentive compatibility (10) and are indierent between diligent behavior and shirking, such




revenues and investment expenditures of marginal producers are independent of capabilities
and depend on xed parameters only:
sl(zl) =
fl














These expressions for marginal rms are obtained by combining optimal innovation choices
(11) and (12) with the cuto eciency levels (17). An increase in the private benet b
aggravates moral hazard and requires a higher cuto eciency level (17) to meet incentive
compatibility (10), resulting in exit of low capability rms. Graphically, marginal-access
curves in Figure 2 shift upwards. Similar selection eects occur if xed production costs
go up. Furthermore, the cuto level (17) increases in technology cost parameters  and ;
and decreases in market size Al. Whereas the private benet imposes an access barrier to
external nance and aects the extensive margin, a change in credit costs induces within-rm
adjustments. The impact of credit conditions can be interpreted in a slightly dierent way:
capital market imperfections impose minimum quality requirements. To see this, we follow




















Like revenues and prots, the quality-price ratio is an increasing function of both innovation
choices and thus of rm's eciency z, as depicted in Figure 3. Whereas process innova-
tions decrease prices for any given quality, product upgrades increase quality for any given
13The two-dimensional selection pattern is closely related to Sutton (2007).
14Compare Sutton (2012), chapter 1.6.
13
price. Faced with higher borrowing rates, rms scale down both types of innovation re-
sulting in a lower quality-price ratio. Graphically, within-rm adjustments correspond to a
downward shift of the quality-price prole depicted in Figure 3 for two dierent borrowing
rates: r1 < r2. While this eect negatively inuences the intensive margin of international
trade, credit frictions aect the extensive margin. The horizontal line represents a minimum
quality requirement that is necessary to obtain external capital. This threshold is derived by
inserting the cuto eciency level (17) in equation (22). An increase in the private benet
raises the cuto eciency level and hence the minimum quality requirement reected in an
upward shift of the horizontal line in Figure 3, whereas within-rm adjustments and hence
changes in the individual price-adjusted quality are not present. The remainder of the paper
discusses the implications of within-rm adjustments and selection eects in partial and gen-
eral equilibrium. Consistent with recent empirical evidence, the following section shows that
reoptimizations of innovation choices can explain positive as well as negative correlations of
credit costs with export prices, depending on the scope for vertical product dierentiation.
In chapters 5 and 6, we analyze the general equilibrium eects of credit tightening.
4 Quality and cost eects in partial equilibrium
This section analyzes how rms respond to changes of credit conditions in partial equilib-
rium, whereby the number of rms and the cuto eciency level remains unchanged. Hence,
results of this analysis could be interpreted as short-term eects of credit tightening. Fur-
thermore, the interest rate r is treated as exogenous, whereas section 5 takes into account
general equilibrium eects and endogenizes the borrowing rate by capital market clearing.
An increase in the borrowing rate r leads to negative eects on both process innovations
















< 0 : (23)
A reduction in the success probability  leads to the same within-rm adjustments as it
increases the rate of return demanded by external investors. Reductions in both types of
investment inuence marginal costs (5) and hence optimal price setting in opposite ways. On
the one hand, rms scale down process innovations resulting in lower production eciency
and increased marginal costs. As equation (14) shows, this cost eect pushes optimal prices
up. On the other hand, producers reduce product investments which leads to an opposing
quality eect and dampens prices. The relative importance of quality and cost eects depends
on the scope for vertical product dierentiation in the production sector.
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The scope for vertical product dierentiation. Following Sutton (2001) as well as
Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), we dene this measure as the ratio of expenditures for quality






(   1) (1  )
r
: (24)
As equation (24) shows, the scope for product dierentiation is independent of rm-specic
capabilities, but increases in the elasticity of substitution  and decreases in the borrowing
rate r. Furthermore, quality dierentiation is lower if investment costs become more convex
(higher ) and the sensitivity of marginal costs to quality increases (higher ). A similar









Increased product market competition (higher ) has a positive eect on process intensity,
whereas the borrowing rate r as well as convexity of investment costs  lower innovation
expenditures relative to rm revenues. The combination of equations (24) and (25) describes
the relative scope for vertical product dierentiation, compared to process innovations, as a











Increases in  and  make quality innovations less eective and reduce the relative expendi-
tures for this investment type. Conversely, the ratio increases in , which changes investment
in favor of product upgrades. Hence, expression (26) reects the relative eectiveness of qual-
ity innovations compared to process innovations and is closely related to the estimation of
quality ladders proposed by Khandelwal (2010). In sectors with higher relative eectiveness,
rms engage more in vertical product dierentiation resulting in a larger demand shifter
q. Following Khandelwal (2010), higher consumer's valuation for quality, conditional on
prices, translates into larger market volumes and represents a proxy for a market's quality
ladder. The relative scope for vertical product dierentiation (26) determines how relative






















Proposition 2 If the scope for vertical product dierentiation is relatively high (low) and
hence  < (>) , rms respond to higher credit costs by decreasing (increasing) the quality
of their products relative to cost-based productivity and set lower (higher) prices.
Consistent with recent empirical evidence, our model rationalizes positive as well as neg-
ative relations of rm-level FOB prices with credit costs, depending on the role of quality
dierentiation in a sector. Secchi et al. (2014) exploit Italian rm-level data and nd that
nancially constrained exporters charge higher prices than unconstrained rms within the
same product-destination market. This positive relationship between credit frictions and
prices points to cost eects, but is reduced for product categories with high quality dif-
ferentiation. Following Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), Secchi et al. (2014) use the ratio of
advertising and R&D expenditures to total sales in U.S. industries as a proxy for vertical
product dierentiation. Hence, the measure is comparable to expression (24) in our theo-
retical model. Closely related, Fan et al. (2015) analyze Chinese rm-level data and nd
evidence for a negative relationship between credit frictions and prices. The authors ra-
tionalize this result by a partial equilibrium model based on Arkolakis (2010) and Manova
(2013) and dierentiate between exogenous and endogenous quality. Fan et al. (2015) show
that constrained rms sell at higher prices when quality is exogenous, whereas the opposite
holds in case of endogenous quality choice. In contrast, our model explains the prevalence
of quality and cost eects when rms endogenously choose two innovation types that aect
marginal production costs in opposite ways. Therefore, we reconcile recent empirical evi-
dence and stress the role of vertical product dierentiation for counteracting cost and quality
eects on prices.
Trade liberalization. Comparable to changes in credit costs, trade liberalization leads
to opposing quality and costs eects on FOB prices of exporters. A reduction in variable
trade costs  induces exporters to invest more both in process and quality innovations shown



















1 + 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< 0: (28)
Analogous to credit shocks, the relative scope for vertical product dierentiation determines
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 1 
1 +  1 
: (29)
15The derivatives follow immediately from equations (11) and (12).
16Compare the expression for relative investment (13) and optimal price setting (14).
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Proposition 3 If the scope for vertical product dierentiation is relatively high (low), such
that  < (>) , trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) of product quality compared
to cost-based eciency and higher (lower) FOB prices:
@( exqx )
@
> (<) 0; @px
@
< (>) 0.
If the degree of vertical dierentiation is high, product quality increases more than cost-
based productivity leading to upward pressure on marginal costs and prices. Conversely, if
the industry is characterized by low product dierentiation, increases in process innovations
and thus the cost reducing eect dominate and lead to negative price reactions. Consistent
with these predictions, Fan et al. (2014) show for Chinese rm-level data that tari reduc-
tions induce quality upgrading of exporters resulting in positive or negative price reactions,
depending on whether the degree of vertical product dierentiation is high or low. To ratio-
nalize this result, the authors extend a Melitz-type partial equilibrium model by endogenous
quality choice. Faced with trade liberalization, rms readjust product quality by solving a
trade-o between increases in demand due to higher quality and decreases in sales due to
higher prices. In contrast, our model shows that trade and credit costs inuence prices at
the rm level through endogenous adjustments of quality and process innovations.
In addition to this partial equilibrium scenario, we analyze the general equilibrium ef-
fects of credit tightening. Considering the selection of rms, the scope for vertical product
dierentiation does not only determine the direction of within-rm adjustments, but also
inuences the role of quality sorting and cost-based productivity sorting in our model with
two sources of rm heterogeneity. Graphically, the slope of the marginal-access curve in the





Hence, sectors with higher quality dierentiation are characterized by atter marginal-access
curves (see Figure 4) and a negative relationship between credit costs and prices. In this
case, access to nance is mainly determined by a minimum requirement on the quality-based
capability and our model is closely related to single-attribute frameworks that focus on
quality sorting (e.g. Baldwin and Harrigan, 2011; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012). Consistent
with recent empirical evidence, prices and rm size are positively correlated if the scope for
vertical product dierentiation is high (e.g. Manova and Zhang, 2012). Larger rms with








In contrast, if the scope for vertical dierentiation is low, marginal-access curves become
steeper and the model resembles a Melitz (2003) - type economy with cost-based sorting.
In sectors with low quality dierentiation, empirical studies point to a negative relation
of rm size and productivity with unit values (Roberts and Supina, 1996; Foster et al.,
17See the pricing rule (14) and Footnote 11.
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2008). Accordingly, larger rms with higher cost-based capability ' invest more in process






< 0: In this case, nancial
shocks induce mainly cost eects resulting in a positive relationship between credit costs and
optimal prices. To analyze the eects of credit tightening on aggregate export performance
and rm selection, the next section presents the general equilibrium.
5 Equilibrium in the open economy
At the entry stage, rms draw both investment capabilities ' and  from a joint probability
distribution h('; ) with positive support over ['; ']  [; ] : As described in section 3.3,
we summarize these two capabilities in a single measure of rm's eciency: z = '(1 ).
The marginal-access cuto levels (17) dene regions in the two-dimensional capability space
('; ), as depicted in Figure 2:
D =











('; ) 2 ['; '] [; ] : z  zx
	
, (32)
where D is the set of all active rms in equilibrium and Dl, with l 2 d; x, denotes regions of
domestic producers and exporters respectively. Ex-ante probabilities of being active in one








and corresponding conditional probabilities are given by s('; ) =
h(';)
s
and l('; ) =
h(';)
l
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l('; )s('; )d'd. (36)
Analogous to Melitz (2003), revenues of a particular rm with eciency z can be expressed








As discussed in section 3.4, revenues of marginal rms depend only on xed parameters of
the model. By taking into account expression (20) and the denition of average eciency
(34), we write expected revenues and prots by group as follows:
esl =
fl







(   1) v

esl   fl. (38)
The equilibrium is determined by equation (38) and a free entry condition to ensure that





whereas  is the exogenous probability of a death shock. Total expected prots are the
weighted sum of prots by group: E =
P
l  lEl, whereby the share of producers in one
group is dened as  l =
l
s
. Equations (38) and (39) determine the minimum eciency
of marginal rms zd that are just able to produce for the domestic market. The general
equilibrium is characterized by two additional conditions. Labor market clearing pins down
the number of active rms M in the economy and capital market clearing determines the
interest rate r. Labor requirements of single rms consist of variable and xed production
costs and can be expressed as functions of revenues:
mcl('; )








sl(z) + fl: (40)
Producers with higher eciency z employ more labor due to increased investment expen-
ditures and larger sales. In equilibrium, the inelastic labor supply L has to be equal to
labor demands in the entry sector (Le = Mefe) and of the two groups of active producers:
L = Le +
P
l Ll. Analogous to Melitz (2003), aggregation of single labor requirements pins
19















l  lesl denotes average revenues in the total economy. This relationship is
obtained by imposing aggregate stability such that the mass of successful entrants is equal
to the mass of rms that are forced to exit due to the exogenous death shock: sMe = M .
















qal ('; )l('; )d'd =
(   1) (1  )
r
Mesl: (43)
More convex investment costs (higher  and ) as well as a higher borrowing rate r scale down
process and quality innovations which leads to lower capital demand. Aggregate investment
expenditures for processes and quality upgrades are functions of average revenues and the
number of rms in the market. The ratio of aggregate investment expenditures leads to the
sectoral scope for vertical product dierentiation (26) that is independent of rm capabilities,
as discussed in section 4. Capital market clearing ensures that aggregate capital demand for












Combining the market clearing conditions for labor (41) and capital (44) uniquely determines




















The interest rate decreases in the investment cost parameters ;  and  as well as in cap-
ital supply K and increases with product market competition captured by the elasticity of
substitution . In the following two sections, we exploit general equilibrium properties of
the model to derive aggregate eects and welfare implications of credit tightening.
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6 Eects of credit tightening in general equilibrium
In general equilibrium, we take into account that credit frictions change the number of
active producers in the sector. To derive explicit solutions of aggregate variables, we assume
that capabilities ' and  are independently Pareto distributed with positive support over
[1; '] [1;1] and ' > 1. The probability of drawing a particular combination of ' and  is
given by: h ('; ) = h'(')h() with h() = 
  1 and h'(') = #
' # 1
1 ' #
, where  and # are
the shape parameters of the Pareto distributions.18 As we consider two symmetric countries,
our general equilibrium analysis neglects implications of bilateral dierences in nancial
development or in credit conditions. In contrast, another strand of literature examines how
national dierences in nancial characteristics inuence cross-border trade and capital ows
(see Antras and Caballero, 2009; Furusawa and Yanagawa, 2010, among others). The next
subsection shows how nancial shocks aect optimal investment and pricing behavior in
general equilibrium and compares the results to the partial equilibrium analysis in section
4. Subsection 6.2 discusses the welfare eects of credit tightening.
Partial equilibrium General equilibrium
Financial shock r " =  # b " r "  # = b "
Vertical dierentiation low high low high low high low high
Process e / quality innovation q - 0 - +
Relative investment e
q
- + 0 - + + -
Price p + - 0 + - - +
Table 1: Financial shocks and optimal rm behavior in partial and general equilibrium
6.1 Eects on investment and price setting
Table 1 summarizes the optimal responses to nancial shocks in partial and general equi-
librium. The main result of this section is that stronger credit frictions (an increase in b
or a decrease in ) reduce the competitive pressure in general equilibrium and reverse the
direction of within-rm adjustments. In contrast, an increase in the interest rate does not
reect stronger credit frictions, but could be caused by a decrease in aggregate capital supply











18For technical reasons, we assume that  > (1 )( 1)

and # > 
(1 ) : Appendix 8.3 derives the cuto
eciency zd explicitly under the assumption of Pareto distributed capabilities.
19Compare the capital market clearing condition in general equilibrium (45) :
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This result depends on the assumption that only endogenous investment costs have to be
nanced by external capital, whereas labor input is used for xed production costs. As Table
1 shows, optimal rm responses to an increase in the borrowing rate r go into the same direc-
tion in partial and general equilibrium. If xed costs have to be nanced by external capital,
exit of low eciency rms would raise the cuto eciency. Consequently, increased compet-
itive pressure would even amplify the responses in general equilibrium without changing the
direction of the eects.20
Proposition 4 An increase in the borrowing rate r has no eect on the extensive margin,
whereas within-rm adjustments go into the same direction in partial and general equilibrium.
In contrast to an increase in borrowing costs r, stronger credit frictions change the direc-
tion of optimal rm responses in general equilibrium. The private benet b can be interpreted
as an inverse measure of nancial development which might be aected by countries' nancial
policies. Following Tirole (2006) and Antras, Desai, and Foley (2009), this managerial bene-
t of shirking might be reduced by improved investor protection or stronger enforceability of
nancial contracts. An increase in the private benet b enhances incentives of borrowers to
misbehave such that external investors demand more pledgeable income to provide loans for
investment. A decrease in the success probability of investment projects  increases the rate
of return required for investors to break even and aggravates moral hazard. Consequently,






























whereas  =   b. Compared to partial equilibrium, the exit of low eciency producers
leads to additional rm adjustments in case of an increase in b and reverses the responses to a
decrease in  (see Table 1). This general equilibrium eect reduces the competitive pressure
in the sector and induces still active suppliers to increase innovation activity. Intuitively,
the negative eect of credit frictions along the extensive margin enhances the benets of
investments for existing rms. Thus, stronger credit frictions lead to an equilibrium with
a lower number of producers that are larger on average. This eect is counteracted by an
increase in the cuto eciency which reduces, but does not outweigh the positive response
of innovation activity.
20See Appendix 8.5 for an extension of the model by external nancing of xed costs.
21See Appendix 8.3 for an explicit derivation of the number of rms in one country.
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Proposition 5 In general equilibrium, stronger credit frictions (an increase in the private
benet b or a reduction in the success probability ) reduce the number of active producers,
raise the cuto eciency zd, and increase innovation activity as well as rm size of existing
suppliers.
Proof. See Appendix 8.4.
In contrast to partial equilibrium, stronger nancial frictions lead to a reduction of prices
in sectors with low quality dierentiation. Thus, credit tightening intensies quality-based
(cost-based) sorting if the scope for vertical dierentiation is high (low). The next subsection
discusses the welfare consequences of nancial shocks.
6.2 Welfare analysis



































An increase in the borrowing rate r leads to negative eects on process and quality innova-






 +  (1  )

< 0: (50)
Proposition 6 An increase in the borrowing rate r leads to negative eects along the inten-
sive margin and welfare losses that are stronger in sectors with high investment intensity.
Elasticity (50) shows that negative welfare eects become more pronounced with increas-
ing quality dierentiation (24) and process intensity (25), when technology parameters ; 
and  are low. Hence, an increase in credit costs leads to greater adjustments of innovation
activity in sectors with high investment intensity. Consequently, consumers face a stronger
decrease in price-adjusted quality resulting in larger welfare losses.
As discussed in the previous subsection, stronger credit frictions cause negative eects
along the extensive margin. The exit of least ecient rms leads to two opposing eects
on consumer welfare (49). On the one hand, welfare decreases due to a lower number of
varieties. On the other hand, the average eciency, and thus the average price-adjusted
22See Appendix 8.2 for a derivation of the welfare function.
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< 0). The eects of credit tightening






































< (>) 0: (52)
Proposition 7 Stronger credit frictions (an increase in the private benet b or a reduction
in the success probability ) reduce consumer welfare if the private benet b is suciently
high. Welfare losses are more pronounced in sectors with low investment intensity (high 
and/or ).
Proof. See Appendix 8.4.
If nancial development is low (captured by a high private benet b), stronger credit
frictions will lead to a large reduction in product variety that outweighs eciency gains.
Proposition 7 shows that the extent of welfare losses after credit tightening depends on the
sectoral investment intensity. An increase in the borrowing rate leads to a larger reduction
in consumer welfare in sectors with high investment intensity due to stronger within-rm
adjustments (see Proposition 6). In contrast, changes in the private benet b and the success
probability  lead to a negative impact along the extensive margin which aects sectors with
low investment intensity more severely. The reason is that consumers in those sectors put
more weight on the loss of variety compared to eciency gains due to the exit of rms. Figure
5 illustrates the larger welfare responses to an increase in b for sectors with high levels of
investment cost parameters  and  (see Table 2 for chosen parameter values). The negative
variety eect and thus welfare losses are more pronounced if nancial development is low
(high private benet) and dispersion of rm capabilities is high (larger values for Pareto
shape parameters). If the distribution of rms in the eciency space is more dispersed,
eciency gains after rm exit will be lower, which results in stronger reactions of welfare.
Thus, the comparative static analysis shows that the eects of nancial shocks within
a sector depend on the investment intensity and the role of quality dierentiation. Both
in partial and general equilibrium, the scope for vertical dierentiation (26) determines
how optimal investment and pricing behavior is aected by credit conditions. Furthermore,
aggregate eects of credit tightening depend on the sectoral investment intensity for quality
(24) and processes (25). Interest rate shocks lead to adjustments along the intensive margin
and especially hurt sectors with high investment intensity. Stronger credit frictions aect
the extensive margin of international trade, whereas sectors with low investment intensity
face larger welfare losses.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the eects of credit frictions on within-rm adjustments and selec-
tion into exporting in a two-dimensional heterogeneous rm model with endogenous inno-
vation choices. Whereas existing trade models with nancial frictions are mainly based on
Melitz (2003), three elements are crucial for our theoretical analysis. First, we allow both for
Melitz-type cost sorting and vertical product dierentiation. Like in single-attribute models,
rm's competitiveness and hence prots are determined by a one-dimensional productivity
measure. The latter can be separated along two dimensions, namely the cost-based and
the quality-based capability of a producer. Second, we consider innovations in quality and
processes associated with endogenous sunk costs that decrease in capabilities. Third, we
assume that investment costs have to be nanced by external investors and introduce credit
constraints motivated by moral hazard based on Holmstrom and Tirole (1997).
We show that the scope for vertical product dierentiation in a sector determines how
nancial shocks aect investment and price setting. Consistent with recent empirical ev-
idence, we rationalize positive as well as negative correlations of FOB prices with credit
frictions and variable trade costs. In addition, we distinguish the eects of nancial frictions
in partial and general equilibrium. In partial equilibrium, which could be interpreted as a
short-term scenario, the number of suppliers is xed and credit tightening leads to negative
eects on investment. In general equilibrium, stronger credit frictions intensify quality-based
(cost-based) sorting of rms if the scope for vertical product dierentiation is high (low).
Consequently, credit tightening leads to rm exit, increased innovation activity among ex-
isting suppliers and welfare losses that are larger in sectors with low investment intensity.
Our theoretical analysis could be extended in several directions. First, we do not allow
for market-specic investments. Both process innovations and quality upgrades are spread
across domestic and foreign markets, whereas recent empirical evidence points to quality-
based market segmentation of exporters (Bastos and Silva, 2010; Manova and Zhang, 2012;
Flach, 2014). Second, suppliers rely on one source of external capital to nance total in-
vestment costs. This allows us to focus on within-rm adjustments, whereas selection ef-
fects between dierent sources of external nance might play an important role as well (see
Hou and Zhang, 2012). Third, whereas our analysis focuses on a CES demand structure,
credit frictions may inuence price-cost markups. Lastly, we concentrate on ex-post moral
hazard to introduce credit rationing. Empirical and theoretical literature suggests other
channels through which nancial market imperfections may inuence export behavior like
higher default risk, information asymmetries regarding rm attributes or imperfect nancial
contractibility (see Manova, 2013; Feenstra et al., 2014, among others).
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8 Mathematical Appendix
8.1 Maximization problem of rm
This section derives the optimal investment and pricing behavior of a rm with export status
l 2 d; x, whereas 1fxx>0g takes a value of 1 if the rm is an exporter and is zero otherwise.

















  kl   fl, (53)
subject to the constraints (7), (8) and (10). The rst order conditions for optimal domestic
prices pl and export prices p
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e 1l = 0, (56)
(+ 3)XP
 (   1) q 2l
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q 1l = 0 (57)
Optimality conditions with respect to credit amount dl and loan repayment kl are:
1   r2 = 0 , (58)
 + 2  3 = 0 , (59)
whereas 1, 2 and 3 are the Lagrange multipliers of the constraints (7), (8) and (10)






, whereas 3 = 0
if incentive compatibility is not binding. The optimal prices (14) follow immediately from
equations (54) and (55). Combining the optimal pricing rules with the rst-order conditions





























Ax = (1 + 
1 )Ad: Equations (60) and (61) show the complementary structure of process
and quality innovations, as discussed in section 3.3. Combining the two expressions leads
to the optimal investment choices described by equations (11) and (12). By inserting the
optimal investment levels into the rst order conditions (54) and (55), one obtains the












, whereas px = px: Inserting the optimal choices of
quality innovation (12) and price setting (14) immediately leads to expression (15). The
optimal loan repayment kl follows from the constraints (7) as well as (8) and can be written













8.2 Derivation of welfare




















By using the expression for rm-specic quality-price ratios (22) and exploiting the labor
market clearing condition (41), consumer welfare can be written as:






















































(1 +  1 )
 
 1 : After some
modications, this allows to write welfare per worker as a function of the cuto eciency
zd, as specied in equation (49).
8.3 Solution with Pareto distributed capabilities
To obtain an explicit solution for the cuto eciency zd, we assume that rm specic capabili-
ties ' and  are independently Pareto distributed with positive support over [1; '][1;1] and
' > 1. The probability of drawing a particular combination of ' and  is then given by:
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h ('; ) = h'(')h() with h() = 
  1 and h'(') = #
' # 1
1 ' #
, where  and # are the
shape parameters of the Pareto distributions. Probabilities of success s and of belonging to
the groups of non-exporters and exporters respectively l, as dened by equation (33), can
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For technical reasons, we assume that the Pareto shape parameters are suciently large,
 > (1 )( 1)

and # > 
(1 )
, such that 
;	 > 0. For the further analysis, we dene a
measure for average eciency z and the average xed costs ef in the economy:
z = 1 +  x
fx
fd
(1 +  1 )

   1
(1 +  1 )


; ef =  dfd +  xfx.
Combining expected prots and the free entry condition, leads to an explicit solution for the








whereas expected prots can be written as: E = 
zfd   ef .
Number of active rms As shown by equation (41), the number of active rms in
one country is a function of labor supply L and average revenues (38). To solve for the
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number of rms explicitly, we use the expressions for expected eciencies of non-exporters




(   1) v
;









. The number of active rms in one country is given by:
M =












and the number of total varieties in one economy is dened as: Mx = (1 +  x)M:
8.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5. The change of the number of rms with respect to the private
benet b and the success probability  , as shown in equations (47) and (48) respectively,
follows immediately from the derivative of equation (66). The derivatives of the cuto























The general equilibrium eects of credit tightening on investment and price setting can be
derived from equations (11)-(14), by taking into account incentive compatibility (17) and
the changes in the cuto eciency (67) and (68). The responses of process and quality




















































< 0. Hence, the general equilibrium response of innovations
is positive whenever private benets are suciently high. The derivatives of the relative
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The responses of investment and price setting to a change in the success probability  can
be derived analogously.




















Note that this condition is satised whenever the private benet b is suciently high, such
that the negative variety eect outweighs eciency gains after credit tightening. Analogously,






















Thus, the welfare reaction is positive if nancial frictions in terms of the private benet b
are suciently high. To show that the welfare loss of credit tightening is more pronounced































> 0. Hence, we consider the limit case if  ap-
proaches innity. Note that lim
!1
ef = fd and lim
!1
E = fd (  1) > 0. In the limit case, the













= 0. Thus, welfare losses become larger in sectors with low quality dieren-
tiation due to the dominating variety eect. A similar argument holds for the investment
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> 0. In the limit case, for the variety






> 0. Note, however, that the eciency eect does







8.5 Extension: external nancing of xed costs











section 3.4). In that case, an increase in the borrowing rate leads to an additional eect along
the extensive margin without changing the direction of rm responses in general equilibrium.
In contrast to shocks related to nancial frictions, there is still a negative response of process
















































rfdz   r ef
E
> 0;






fdz   r ef .
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Figure 4: Iso-eciency curve for low (1) and high (2) vertical product dierentiation
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Parameter Description Value
 Elasticity of substitution 2
;  Investment cost parameter 2
 Marginal cost parameter 0.5
; # Pareto shape parameters 3 / 6
 Iceberg-transportation costs 1.9
fx Fixed trade costs 7
fd Fixed production costs 1
 Success probability diligent behavior 0.7
b Success probability shirking 0
b Private benet 5 / 10
Table 2: Parameter values
Figure 5: Welfare responses to credit tightening for dierent degrees of investment intensity
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